Current Cases by Johnson, Steven J.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 1 | Issue 2 Article 9
January 1985
Current Cases
Steven J. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Steven J. Johnson, Current Cases, 1 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 349 (1985).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol1/iss2/9
CURRENT CASES
UNIVERSITY DISCOUNT SALES AGREEMENTS AND
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE AND NON-PROFIT IN-
STITUTIONS ACT EXEMPTION ON MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT. Computronics, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc.
and the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 600
F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Wise. 1985).
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin has
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on claims of
price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, and has
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on contract and
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law claims. In denying summary judg-
ment the court cited the existence of factual disputes surrounding
the asserted affirmative defenses of business necessity and exemp-
tion under the Non-Profit Institutions Act. That denial substan-
tially increases the potential legal burdens and risks of computer
manufacturers which sell their products to universities at special
discounts. In granting summary judgment, the court relied upon
clear and unambiguous contract language.
In Computronics, the defendant', Apple Computer, Inc., is a
national manufacturer and seller of microcomputers based in
Cupertino, California. Plaintiff, Computronics, Inc., is a Wisconsin
retailer of personal computer software and hardware. In March of
1984, Computronics and Apple entered into a dealership agreement
wherein Computronics was to purchase Apple's products for resale
to retail customers in the Dane County, Wisconsin area. The con-
tract specifically appointed Computronics as a non-exclusive au-
thorized Apple dealer.2
© 1985 by Bradley . Elkin. All Rights Reserved.
1. The University of Wisconsin was named as a defendant in Computronics' original
complaint. The district court dismissed the claims against the University on the University's
motion, based on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Whereas the amended complaint of Com-
putronics did not change the theories pertaining to the Board of Regents, the district court
granted the University's renewed motion for dismissal, citing the opinion for the previous
motion as dispositive. See 600 F. Supp. at 810.
2. 600 F. Supp. at 811. The contract, at paragraph I(b), provided as follows: "[Com-
putronics'] appointment as an authorized Apple Dealer shall be non-exclusive and such ap-
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In October of 1984, the University of Wisconsin entered into
an agreement with Apple whereby the University agreed to
purchase at least $10 million worth of computers. The purchase
price to the University was at a significant discount, and the con-
tract allowed resale to students and staff on the condition that the
products could not be thereafter further resold.
Computronics' amended complaint against Apple alleged that
several of the products sold by Apple to the University were deliv-
ered at prices below those charged to Computronics.3 In its com-
plaint, therefore, Computronics charged Apple with price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.4 In addition,
Computronics' complaint against Apple charged both breach of
contract (contending that the class of parties to whom Apple re-
served the right to make other sales of its merchandise in the mar-
ket area did not include the University) and breach of Wisconsin
Fair Dealership Law5 (contending that Apple's sales to the Univer-
sity changed the competitive circumstances of the dealership
agreement).
The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), provides that
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . . to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality. . . where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be to substantially lessen competition . . . ."I Apple's
motion for summary judgment on the price discrimination cause of
action alleged two affirmative defenses: first, an exemption for busi-
ness necessity found at 15 U.S.C. § 13(b), and, second, an exemp-
tion for sales to non-profit institutions found at 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)
(the Non-Profit Institutions Act). The district court presumed the
existence of a prima facie case of price discrimination for the pur-
poses of the motion, and considered each affirmative defense in
turn.
The district court first held that the business necessity defense
was not amenable to summary judgment at this stage of the pro-
ceeding.7 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) provides that a seller may rebut a prima
facie case of price discrimination "by showing that his lower price
pointment does not constitute a grant of any specific territory, geographical area, or
particular market."
3. 600 F. Supp. at 811. In fact, the prices charged by the University for resale to
students and staff were often lower than those charged by Apple to Computronics.
4. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
5. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 135.04 (West 1974).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
7. 600 F. Supp. at 811.
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. . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor ... ."8 The defense requires that the seller offer the lower
price in good faith for the purpose of meeting and in response to a
competitor's low price.9 A showing of facts giving rise to a reason-
able belief that equally low prices were available from a competitor
will usually be sufficient to establish the seller's good faith. But not
always. 10 According to the district court, the concept of good faith
is flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctrinaire.1 The stan-
dard of good faith is simply "the standard of the prudent business-
man responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation
of competitive necessity."12 Whether this standard is met depends
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, not on ab-
stract theories or remote conjectures. 13
In its analysis, the district court in Computronics acknowl-
edged the need for subjective judgment to decide the question of
business necessity. It recognized that the price offered by Apple to
the University may have been necessary to meet the prices of com-
petitors.14 Nevertheless, the court held that the facts and circum-
stances regarding the good faith of Apple and the underlying
business necessity were not sufficiently established to support sum-
mary judgment.15
The district court further held that Apple's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the Robinson-Patman claim must be denied be-
cause application of the Non Profit Institutions Act (Apple's second
affirmative defense) was not clear. The Non Profit Institutions Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13(c), provides that nothing in Section 13 of the Robin-
son-Patman Act 6 "shall apply to purchasers of their supplies for
their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries,
churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for
profit." 17 The key controversy surrounding this affimative defense
8. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b).
9. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanceo Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 439 (1983).
10. Id.
11. 600 F. Supp. at 812.
12. Id. See also 103 S.Ct. at 1292; Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163
(1963).
13. 460 U.S. at 441.
14. 600 F. Supp. at 812. For instance, IBM, Digital Equipment Corp. and others had
agreements with the University of Wisconsin providing discounts on their computer equip-
ment to students and staff.
15. 600 F. Supp. at 812.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (emphasis added).
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for the purposes of the summary judgment motion was whether the
computers purchased by the University were for "their own use'
The district court cited Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists18 as providing significant support for the proposition that
the sales by Apple to the University were exempt under § 13(c).
Abbott Laboratories involved discount sales by a drug manufacturer
to certain hospitals. Therein the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced the "test" to determine whether a product is for the
buyer's "own use" to be as follows: "[T]heir own use is what rea-
sonably may be regarded as use by the hospital in the sense that
such use is a part of and promotes the hospital's intended institu-
tional operation in the care of persons who are its patients."19 The
Supreme Court then held that drug purchases were exempt from
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act as being for the hos-
pital's own use where they were dispensed to hospital employees,
students or their dependents since each such person was a member
of the hospital family and such dispensations did further the hospi-
tal function.20
While the court in Computronics recognized the parallel be-
tween sales by the hospital to staff and students in Abbott Laborato-
ries and similar sales to students and staff by the University of
Wisconsin, it was unable to find the Abbott Laboratories authority
dispositive on the summary judgment motion. The court denied
Apple's motion for summary judgment because a question existed
as to whether the limits on the University discount program were
sufficient to maintain that program within the their own use require-
ment of § 13c. For example, the court first noted that the Apple-
University contract allows non-instructional staff, such as janitors,
to purchase the product at a discount.2" Secondly, the court noted
that there was no realistic way to limit the use of Apple's merchan-
dise to that of education.22 In this regard, the court pointed out
that a student could purchase a computer just before graduation
with the intention of using it in business after graduation. Argua-
bly, in such case, the sale would not be in furtherance of the Univer-
sity's institutional function. Lastly, the district court noted its
concern over a potential misuse of the University's power to catego-
18. 425 U.S. 1 (1976).
19. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 16.
21. 600 F. Supp. at 812.
22. Id.
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rize almost anything as serving an educational purpose.23 In light
of the foregoing, the district court held that summary judgment on
the Robinson-Patman Act claim must be denied due to the exist-
ence of material factual disputes.2 4
The denial of Apple's motion for summary judgment in Com-
putronics may have important ramifications in the computer indus-
try.25 Major manufacturers of personal computers have developed
discount programs in many large universities. 26 On one level, uni-
versities (and the accompanying student-staff purchases) bring com-
panies such as Apple a great deal of present business. Apple's
agreement with the University of Wisconsin for example, was for a
minimum purchase of $10 million. On another perhaps more im-
portant level, manufacturers of microcomputers have a strong in-
trest in reaching university level users. If a particular company can
make agreements which allow them to train students on their equip-
ment, and to make sure via discount sales that the students first
hardware is their product, the company will have exposed the stu-
dent to the language of their product. Once exposed, students may
well continue to purchase and utilize the same product line after
graduation and in business because of, among others reasons, the
established familiarity. In consideration of the interest computer
23. Id. For instance, putting a stereo in the hands of students could be justified as a
contribution towards their appreciation of music.
24. Id. The court also noted that a purchase agreement which has as one of its major
considerations the intended resale of the computers by the University may take the program
out of the "their own use" requirement, citing Abbott and Students Book Company v. Wash-
ington Law Book, 232 F.2d 49, 50 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
25. There is some question regarding the precedential value of the court's denial of
summary judgment on the price discrimination claim in this case. According to counsel for
Apple, Apple's motion for summary judgment was filed concurrently with Apple's response
to Computronics' application for a preliminary injunction. As a result, the motion for sum-
mary judgment was argued early in the course of litigation. The arguments for summary
judgment were never separately briefed. There may not have been enough time to fully de-
velop the factual or legal arguments surrounding the summary judgment. If benefited by the
months of discovery and preparation which often precedes a motion for summary judgment,
and presented with more fully developed arguments, the district court may have reached a
different result on one or both of Apple's two defenses to the price discrimination claim.
Telephone interview with Robert Christiansen, Esq., of Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisc.,
March 5, 1985.
In an unreported decision, the district court denied Computronics' application for pre-
liminary injunction. Subsequently, by order filed January 29, 1985, the district court granted
Computronics' motion for voluntary dismissal. The court's order was without prejudice, but
with costs to Apple. The court retained the power to order further costs to Apple if Compu-
tronics commenced an action including or based on the same claims.
26. Apple, for example, currently has contracts with approximately 170 campuses na-
tionwide. IBM has a similar number of contracts and serves as Apple's primary competition
in the university market. Telephone interview with Mr. Jeff Barco, Programs Manager -
University Sales Group, Apple Computer, Inc., Cupertino, CA, March 5, 1985.
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manufacturers have in piercing the university market and of the
great competition in that market, the district court's decision in
Computronics constitutes a temporary setback to computer compa-
nies. Chances are good that affirmative defenses such as those Ap-
ple raised will ultimately succeed at trial. But as yet they have not
proved sufficient to support summary judgment. Denied the oppor-
tunity to dispose of suits by local computer retailers via summary
judgment, computer manufacturers will have to go through the ex-
pense and inconvenience of taking every case to trial or settlement.
In its cause of action for breach of contract, Computronics ap-
parently alleged that the dealership agreement allowed Apple to sell
its product only to a limited class of alternative buyers in the rele-
vant area, and that the University was not a proper alternative
buyer.27 Paragraph 1(b) of the contract provided that Computron-
ics' appointment as dealer was non-exclusive, and that Apple "re-
serve[d] the right to appoint other authorized dealers and resellers
and to make direct sales to anyone at anytime without notice or
liability to dealer."2
Apple's motion for summary judgment was granted on the
contract cause of action. The court first agreed that sales to the
University were not direct sales since the intent was to transfer title
to the student/staff end user.2 9 But the court rejected Computron-
ics' argument that the University was not a reseller. They found
instead that the contract language regarding resale was clear and
unambiguous on its face. The court held that the term "reseller"
was used in a broad reservation of rights clause and was clearly
meant to cover "any other kind of retailer or wholesaler who is not
an authorized dealer."30 The court found that the University of
Wisconsin was covered as a reseller under the terms of the dealer-
ship agreement.
With regard to the cause of action for violation of the Wiscon-
sin Fair Dealership Law31, the district court also granted Apple's
motion for summary judgment. The court held that since Apple's
conduct conformed to what it expressly reserved the right to do in
27. The contract cause of action also alleged implied agreements which would make
sales to the University a breach, but the court found no merit to the allegations in light of a
clear and unambiguous integration clause.
28. 600 F. Supp. at 811.
29. 600 F. Supp. at 813.
30. Id.
31. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 135.04 (West 1974), which provides, in pertinent part: "[A]
grantor shall provide a dealer at least 90 days prior written notice of. . .substantial change
in competitive circumstances."
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the agreement (namely, to make sales of merchandise to other resel-
lers), then that conduct could not be said to change the competitive
circumstances of the dealership agreement. 2
As a guide to future practice, Computronics teaches the follow-
ing: Firstly, that the business necessity defense to a Robinson-Pat-
man price discrimination claim, being dependent on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, may not easily lend itself to
summary judgment. The good faith element of that defense may
require more than just evidence that competitors charge low prices.
Manufacturers should make sure that the circumstances adequately
indicate that the low prices they charge are in response to low prices
charged by their competitors. Absent a clear indication, the manu-
facturer should prepare to take the case to trial. Secondly, language
establishing university discount programs should be carefully
drafted. Limitations should be made to the extent possible to re-
strict who can buy the merchandise and for what purposes it may
be used so that the their own use requirement of the Non-Profit In-
stitutions Act is met. At the very least, sales by the university must
be shown to further the university's institutional function. Lastly,
clear and unambiguous language in a dealership agreement specify-
ing the class of alternative parties to whom the distributor may sell
its merchandise in a certain area will be invaluable in protecting
later conduct and sales from breach of contract claims or from vio-
lation of local commerical law.
Bradley J. Elkin
32. 600 F. Supp. at 813.
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COPYRIGHT LAW: ONLY COPYING OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS BY OWNER-USERS PROTECTED BY SECTION
117(1). Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
The District Court for the Central District of California held a
maker of computer kits closely resembling the Apple II personal
computer in contempt for violating a preliminary injunction against
copying plaintiff Apple Computer's copyrighted computer pro-
grams. In purchasing Apple-copyrighted programs on diskettes,1
recording them on silicon chips,2 and selling the diskettes and chips
along with its computer kits, defendant Formula International, Inc.
(Formula), relied on subsection (1) of section 117 of the Copyright
Act,3 which permits the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make other copies under limited circumstances. Judge Irving Hill's
0 1985 by Steven J. Johnson. All Rights Reserved.
1. A diskette is a storage medium for data and computer programs. A program re-
corded on a diskette may be "loaded" into a computer's memory. Thus, the copy of a copy-
righted computer program recorded on a diskette is again copied when loaded into memory.
If a program is recorded on a diskette, the user may be able to modify the program at a later
time. This is not true if the same program is "burned in" on a silicon chip.
2. Computer programs may be recorded on silicon chips for direct incorporation into
the computer itelf or for insertion in cartridges. For a description of the use of silicon chips
in video game cartridges, see Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] CoPY-
RIGHT L. REP. (CCH) T 25,613, at 18,693 (N.D. I1. 1983).
Operating system programs, which generally manage the internal functions of the com-
puter, may be recorded onto silicon chips and built into the computer when assembled.
Formula unsuccessfully argued on motion for preliminary injunction that such operating sys-
tems programs, regardless of the medium in which they are recorded, are not copyrightable.
Judge Hill rejected defendant's arguments and granted the preliminary injunction, relying on
the plain language of the Copyright Act, legislative history and public policy. Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affid, 725 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1984). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'g 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
3. Section 117, as amended in 1980, provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no
other manner, or
(2) that such copy or adaptation is for archival purpose only. ...
17 U.S.C. Section 117 (1982). The instant opinion does not attempt to interpret subsection
(2) of Section 117. 594 F. Supp. at 620 n.2. For an analysis of the archival copy exception of
subsection (2), see generally Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.
Mass. 1984) (purpose of exception to protect against damage by mechanical or electrical
failure).
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opinion analyzes subsection (1) of section 117 for the first time in
the Ninth Circuit, adding the following three principles to the
emerging body of copyright law:
(1) Only an owner-user of a computer who rightfully owns a
copy of a copyrighted program is authorized to make another
copy of that program, and this copying must be necessary for
him to be able to use the copyrighted program in his computer;
(2) The copy authorized by section 117 must be made only for
the owner-user's internal use and must be destroyed when the
original copyrighted work is resold; and
(3) The copy thus made by the owner-user cannot be made ac-
cessible to others.
4
Formula initially marketed a computer kit called the "Pineap-
ple" in May of 1982. The assembled Pineapple computer looked
like an Apple II, and its uses and capacities were similar if not iden-
tical.' The kit and its peripheral equipment contained diskettes
and ROMs6 that were virtually identical copies of certain Apple-
copyrighted programs.7
Apple filed suit on three separate theories: copyright infringe-
ment, trademark infringement and unfair competition.8 In Septem-
ber of 1982, Apple moved for a preliminary injunction. Judge Hill
held that all computer programs are copyrightable and enjoined
Formula from copying any of Apple's copyrighted computer pro-
4. 594 F. Supp. at 621-622 (emphasis in original).
5. 562 F. Supp. at 777.
6. ROM, or Read Only Memory, is a type of nonvolatile memory. Memory consists of
a pattern of binary digits, and if the state of the binary digits can be read, but not changed,
then the memory is called Read Only Memory. Usually ROM is implemented in single
silicon chips, and those chips may also be called "ROMs". By comparison, one can read and
write into read/write memory. Read/write memories are commonly, and inaccurately, re-
ferred to as Random Access Memories (RAM). See generally A. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO MICROCOMPUTERS: VOLUME 1 - BASIC CONCEPTS 3-1 - 3-11 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as OSBORNE].
7. Two of the programs, Autostart and Applesoft, were embodied in ROMs. The other
three programs, HELLO, DOS 3.3 and Apple Integer BASIC were recorded on diskettes. All
five programs were registered under the Copyright Act and each diskette bore a copyright
notice on its face, while each ROM had a copyright notice either printed on the ROM itself
or immediately next to it on the circuit board to which it was affixed. 562 F. Supp. at 776-
777. For a complete description of the five programs at issue see Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4.
8. 562 F. Supp. at 777. The trademark claim was based on Formula's adoption of the
"Pineapple" name. The unfair competition claim was based on (1) alleged misappropriation
of Apple's efforts in developing an integral computer component called a "Mother Board,"
and (2) alleged palming off, resulting from the use of similar names in marketing. The com-
plaint also alleged infringement of two of Apple's patents, but the published opinions in the
case do not address the patent claims.
[Vol. I
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grams.9 Formula was also enjoined from importing, distributing,
selling or advertising for sale any silicon chips, ROMs or diskettes
which contained any copy of Apple-copyrighted programs, and
from using any trademark or trade name confusingly similar to
those used by Apple. l0 In February of 1984, Judge Hill's order was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit."
Formula had already modified the appearance of its assembled
Pineapple kits, and in response to the injunction eliminated from its
computers and computer kits any of Apple's copyrighted programs.
Formula also changed the name of its computers from "Pineapple"
to "Pinecom". 12
Formula triggered the contempt motion, however, by including
in each sale of a Pinecom kit a "ROM Set" consisting of a diskette,
three silicon chips, and an instruction manual.' 3 Formula
purchased the diskettes from a Mr. T.W. Wong of Hong Kong who
was licensed by Apple to copy two Apple-copyrighted operating
systems programs14 and to record those programs on diskettes
9. 562 F. Supp. at 775. The preliminary injunction issued on April 11, 1983.
10. Id.
11. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). The District Court found that Apple had shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright and trademark infringement claims and
significant irreparable harm. 562 F. Supp. at 783, 785. On appeal Formula had to establish
that the District Court abused its discretion by basing its order either on an erroneous legal
standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Formula argued that the District Court
incorrectly concluded that all computer programs are copyrightable, and therefore applied an
erroneous legal standard. The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the District Court, hold-
ing that all computer programs are copyrightable.
In the interim between the District Court's decision and the Ninth Circuit's affirmance,
a parallel case went to the Third Circuit on an appeal from denial of preliminary injunction.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1240, defendant Franklin
was accused, as Formula here, of copying the'same five programs (among others) and using
them in a competing personal computer. Apple's complaints in both cases were framed iden-
tically.
Relying on its earlier decision in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982) (all ROMs copyrightable regardless of their utilitarian function), the Third
Circuit held that an Apple operating system program was copyrightable because it was only
one of many ways to express the same idea. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case had
the benefit of the Third Circuit's analysis when it rejected Formula's contention that some
computer programs, but not others, are copyrightable.
In addition, Formula contended on appeal that Apple had not produced sufficient evi-
dence of harm to Apple if Formula were allowed to continue distributing copies of the Apple-
copyrighted programs pending final judgment. The Ninth Circuit noted that Apple had in-
vested considerable time and money into the development of the programs and that
Formula's sale of the Pineapple computer kits only comprised a small percentage of
Formula's total sales. Thus Apple had shown the requisite possibility of irreparable injury in
addition to a probability of success on the merits. 725 F.2d at 525-526.
12. 594 F. Supp. at 617-618.
13. Id. at 618-619.
14. Autostart and Applesoft. See supra note 7.
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along with his own original programs.
Though Formula had the right to purchase and sell the Wong
diskettes, Apple argued that the injunction was violated when
Formula copied the Apple-copyrighted programs in permanent
form onto silicon chips, and then sold the chips."5 Formula con-
tended that its conduct was permissible under subsection (1) of sec-
tion 117, as amended in 1980.16 At the time the contempt motion
was argued and a formal order issued, no court, commentator or
text had analyzed the purpose and scope of subsection (1) of section
117.17 Only the materials and reports of the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU) pro-
vided legislative history for the Court to interpret."
CONTU's Final Report noted that computer programs written
on paper cannot be used by a computer unless copied into a
machine-readable form. 9 Similarly, a program recorded on a dis-
kette cannot be used by a computer unless the program is first cop-
ied, or "loaded" into memory. Therefore the Commission was of
the opinion that section 117 was being recommended to "facilitate
use of computer programs" by allowing such copying.2"
Judge Hill focused on portions of the Final Report indicating
that the right to copy extends only to rightful possessors, 21 and
noted a statement in a transcript of a Commission meeting to the
effect that the copying must be necessary for the owner-user to be
able to utilize the program in his own computer.22 From these au-
15. Id.
16. Counsel for Apple and Formula agreed before the contempt hearing that any con-
duct permissible under the Copyright Act would not be in violation of the preliminary injunc-
tion. See id. at 619. For text of section 117 see supra note 3.
17. Id. at 620. After the contempt opinion was completed and was ready for transmit-
tal to the publisher for publication in Federal Supplement, the Court's attention was called to
an opinion in Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984). 594 F.
Supp. at 623 n.5. For an analysis of Micro-Sparc, see infra n.43.
18. The Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyright Works (CONTU) was the result of a six year congressional study of copyright law
and computer software. The Final Report recommended certain amendments to the Copy-
right Act of 1976, including the replacement of the old section 117 with the present section
117. Congress adopted all of the CONTU recommendations, and section 117 was not specifi-
cally mentioned in the committee reports nor debated in the House or Senate. Thus, the
CONTU reports and materials constitute the entire legislative history of section 117. H.R.
REP. No. 1307, (Part I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6460 [hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT]. See generally Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in
Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663-769.
19. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 13.
20. Id.
21. 594 F. Supp. at 621.
22. Id., (citing CONTU MEETING NO. 19 at 98-99 (January 1978)).
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thorities the Court extracted the first principle that "[o]nly an
owner-user of a computer who rightfully owns a copy of a copy-
righted program is authorized to make another copy of that pro-
gram, and this copying must be necessary for him to be able to use
the copyrighted program in his computer." 3
The second principle, that the copy must be made "only for the
owner-user's internal use and must be destroyed when the original
copyrighted work is resold,"'2 was drawn from a report sent to
CONTU on behalf of the National Science Foundation.25 Finally,
from that source and from a Commission discussion applying sec-
tion 117 to data bases, the Court drew a third principle that the
copy "cannot be made accessible to others."2 6 All three principles
only apply in the absence of authorization from the copyright
holder.27
Applying these new principles to the facts, the Court found
that Formula was not an "owner-user" of the programs, and that
the copying of the Apple-copyrighted programs on the Wong dis-
kettes was not for Formula's "internal use."2 In addition, Formula
did not destroy the copies it made when it resold the Wong disket-
tes, and in any event, Formula made the programs available to
others. Therefore, the Court found that Formula's conduct was not
permitted under subsection (1) of section 117 and was in violation
of the injunction.29
As an alternative ground for holding Formula in contempt, the
Court noted that the new copies were not created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine.3 0 Thus, the Court identified a fourth new principle under
subsection (1) of section 117: "[T]he type of copying authorized by
the statute must be no more permanent than is reasonably neces-
sary."31 Since the programs recorded on the Wong diskettes could
23. Id. at 621-622.
24. Id. at 622.
25. Id., (citing R. Saltman, Computer Science and Technology: Copyright in Computer-
readable wvorks, Policy Impacts of Technological Change, in III COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND
TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC REcORD 368 (N. Henry ed. 1980)).
26. Id.
27. "If a copy of the work is to be stored in a computer and subsequently made
acessible to others, its creation would have to be properly authorized by the copyright propri-
etor." CONTU FINAL REPORT at 39-40.
28. 594 F. Supp. at 622.
29. Id.
30. Id. See supra note 3.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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be loaded into Random Access Memory (RAM), 32 creating tempo-
rary copies of the programs while the computer's power remained
on, Formula's copying of the programs into Read-Only Memory
(ROM) was convenient, but not essential.33
The problems with the Court's fourth principle are twofold.
First, while the Court made a distinction between RAM and ROM,
it failed to note that permanence is a relative concept when applied
to contemporary methods of storing computer programs. If the
Court meant to draw a distinction between volatile and nonvolatile
memories when it distinguished RAM and ROM,34 then a problem
is posed by computers that keep programs in-RAM alive while the
computer is turned off by using an internal power source. 35 While
all ROM memories are nonvolatile, additional problems may be
posed by the use of Programmable Read-Only Memories (PROMs),
Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories (EPROMs), Electri-
cally Alterable Read-Only Memories (EAROMs), and recently de-
veloped Bubble Memories, which are nonvolatile memories often
referred to, inaccurately, as "Bubble RAMs."36
32. RAM is a volatile type of memory in which computer programs can be temporarily
recorded. A computer user may load a program recorded on diskette into RAM. All
programmable microcomputers have some RAM, and most microcomputers use bath semi-
conductor RAMs and ROMs. Data stored in RAM is lost when the power source is shut off.
"There are two types of RAM memory: dynamic RAM and static RAM. Dynamic
RAM, which is cheaper, can only hold data for a few milliseconds; therefore dynamic RAM
must constantly be refreshed by having its contents rewritten. Dynamic RAM refresh be-
comes part of the interface and support logic surrounding the RAM module .... Static
RAM costs more than dynamic RAM, but once data have been written into it, the data will
stay there as long as power is being input." OSBORNE, supra note 6, at 3-11.
33. 594 F. Supp. at 622.
34. "Core and bubble memories hold their magnetic charge even when disconnected
from electric power.... Core memories are therefore said to be 'nonvolatile.' Semiconduc-
tor memories generally lose all stored data the moment you shut off their power source;
therefore they are said to be 'volatile.' OSBORNE, supra note 6, at 3-2.
35. Some microcomputers have batteries that keep programs and data stored in RAM
alive even when the external power source is turned off. Though RAM is a volatile type of
memory, copying a program into RAM that is supported by an internal power source may
very well be "more permanent than reasonably necessary." In addition, the Court failed to
distinguish between dynamic and static RAM. See supra note 32.
36. A PROM is a device that allows the owner-user to insert information onto a chip
using relatively inexpensive equipment. Once a PROM has been programmed, the user can
read the information out of the PROM as often as desired, but can never write into it again.
The user simply uses the PROM in the microcomputer as a ROM, and then when the user
wants to change the information, the PROM need only be pulled out, thrown away, and
replaced with a new PROM.
An EPROM costs a little more than a PROM, but allows the user to erase the EPROM
contents (usually by shining ultraviolet light on it). EPROMs are also used like ROMs in
microcomputers. When the user wants to reprogram an EPROM, he simply removes it,
shines ultraviolet light on it, and then rewrites into it. Thus, it is difficult to conclude, for
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Second, the court failed to analyze the effect of the archival
exception in subsection (2) of section 11717 on the fourth principle
drawn from subsection (1). The Court's analysis contemplates the
creation of two different copies from the copy purchased by an
owner-user. The first is a copy created as an "essential step" in the
utilization of the program when the owner-user inputs the program
into memory. The second is an "archival" copy, the purpose of
which is "to protect the use of a copy against a particular type of
risk: 'destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical failure.' ""
Since the instant opinion does not attempt to construe the archival
exception in conjunction with subsection (1), the question remains
whether an owner-user can purchase a copy of a program, copy that
program in a more permanent form, and then retain the purchased
copy as a backup "archival" copy. For example, if an owner-user
purchases an Apple-copyrighted program on diskette and then cop-
ies the program onto a hard disk,39 under the Court's fourth princi-
ple the copy onto the hard disk is not an essential step in the
utilization of the program. Arguably, however, the copy onto the
hard disk is permissible under the archival exception, and the subse-
quent copy from the hard disk into RAM is permissible as an "es-
sential step" in the utilization of the program.'
example, that this form of ROM is more "permanent" than RAM that is kept alive indefi-
nitely by use of an internal power source.
An EAROM is a Read Only Memory that can be written into at any time without
erasing prior contents. This is accomplished with special circuits. EAROM contents, how-
ever, degrade with every read operation. Thus, EAROMs seem less permanent than other
variations of ROM.
Bubble memories are the latest in memory devices and they differ in structure from
semiconductor memories. The latter are generally used in microcomputers. Bubble memo-
ries are economical under present technology only in larger computers where they provide
very large memory capacities. Though bubble memories are often called "bubble RAMS,"
they are, in fact, partially serial and partially Random Access Memories. OSBORNE, supra
note 6, at 3-5.
37. Subsection (2) of section 117 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(2) that any such new copy of adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that the continued possession of
the computer program should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
38. Atari v. JS & A Group, 25,613, at 18,696 (quoting CONTU FINAL REPORT,
supra note 18, at 31).
39. A hard disk is a medium for storing data which can hold more information than a
diskette but is usually not removeable and portable.
40. The court inAtari v. JS & A Group determined that not all of the media used for the
storage of computer programs are susceptible to mechanical or electrical failure. "The me-
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At about the same time Judge Hill was deciding Apple v.
Formula, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts was
also interpreting subsection (1) of section 117 as a matter of first
impression. In Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp.,4  the Court ex-
amined the CONTU Final Report and concluded that subsection
(1) of section 117 "refers to the placement of a program into a com-
puter - or, in the jargon of the trade, the 'inputting' of it."'42 Thus,
the Micro-Sparc opinion is in accord with Judge Hill's interpreta-
tion of the statute.
Both the Apple v. Formula and the Micro-Sparc decisions evi-
dence a growing trend toward protectionism of computer hardware
and software markets via copyright law.43 Though the Copyright
Act was probably never intended to protect proprietary rights in
hardware, by establishing the copyrightability of operating systems
programs, Apple has been able to protect its hardware market by
making it more difficult for competitors to make their hardware
compatible with Apple-compatible software. The instant opinion
continues that trend by restricting unauthorized copying of operat-
ing systems programs by competitors in the hardware market. In
the process, the Apple v. Formula court has placed limits on the
owner-user of software by outlawing copying for the sake of con-
dium of storage must, therefore, determine whether the archival exception applies." Id., 1
25,613, at 18,696. The court held that ROMs encased in cartridges that could plug in and out
of microcomputers were not subject to mechanical or electrical failure, and therefore archival
copies of programs recorded in such media were not authorized by subsection (2) of section
117. See id. at 18,696-18,697. Under the reasoning of theAtari court, programs recorded on
diskettes could be copied for archival purposes, but not programs recorded on hard disks.
41. 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984).
42. Id. at 34-35. In Micro-Sparc, freelance programmers sold programs to Nibble, a
computer magazine published by plaintiff Micro-Sparc, which subsequently copyrighted the
programs and published them in its magazine. Purchasers of the magazine were authorized
to input the programs on their personal computers, a tedious task that could take up to 30
hours for a single program, or they could purchase the programs on diskettes fVom the plain-
tiff for between $20.00 and $30.00 per program. The defendant, Amtype, offered a "typing
service" to purchasers of the magazine, and for a fee of up to $10.00 would put on one disk all
of the programs that appeared in any one issue of Nibble. To do this, the defendant typed the
programs into a computer and then transferred them onto a "master disk." The defendant
then copied the programs from the master disk onto blank diskettes to send to its customers.
The court held that only the copying by owner-users into their own computers was
protected by subsection (1) of section 117 as an "essential step" in the utilization of those
programs. The court also found that subsection (2) would permit a purchaser of the maga-
zine that typed the programs in himself to make an archival copy of each program because
the copies in RAM would be susceptible to mechanical or electrical failure. The court held,
however, that the archival exception would not permit the defendant to put Nibble programs
on disks for archival purposes because the purchaser had not first created a 'destructable' or
'damageable' copy. Id. at 34-36.
43. See R. Sterne & P. Saidman, Copying Mass-Marketed Software, 10 BYTE 387, 389
(1985).
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venience, which is something that may not have been objectionable
to the copyright holder in the first place. User-convenience, how-
ever, will always be a prime consideration in the formation of licens-
ing agreements with end-users.4
Though the Apple v. Formula decision appears consistent with
a reasonable interpretation of the legislative history behind subsec-
tion (1) of section 117, the context of the decision should not be
forgotten. Judge Hill was adamant in pointing out that the case
"was initially begun because Formula sought, in several ways, to
take advantage of the good name and good reputation acquired by
Apple. . .. " The following excerpt from the opinion is particu-
larly instructive:
Confronted with a decision that computer programs were
copyrightable and with a preliminary injunction later afirmed on
appeal, Formula hit upon a pretext to avoid the impact of the
injunction and to achieve the same improper objective. Formula
found itself in the fortuitous circumstance of being able lawfully
to acquire copies of two of Apple's most valuable programs
through purchase of the Wong diskette. It then conceived the
idea that Section 117 would shield it from liability ....
I find Formula's claimed justification to be mere pretext and
to be outside the protection of Section 117. I do not believe that
Section 117 should be construed in a manner that would effec-
tively emasculate the protections for computer programs con-
tained in other sections of the Copyright Act.46
It should be noted that in the instant case defense counsel was
able to raise unsettled issues of law in a contempt proceeding after
informing opposing counsel and the Court that it intended to pro-
ceed in a manner that it felt was permitted by law. Judge Hill noted
that "[t]he fact that this was a first impression matter and Formula
was not guided by any prior court decision [did] not excuse its acts
or militate against those acts being held to be in contempt."'47 The
Court, however, took account of the fact that Formula had raised
unsettled issues of law in the contempt proceeding when it fixed the
penalty. To purge the contempt, by stipulation, Formula was re-
quired to comply with the original injunction, to erase or destroy
the unauthorized copies of Apple-copyrighted programs it pos-
44. For example, a licensing agreement might authorize the purchaser of a software
package to copy the programs and data contained therein onto a hard disk, retaining the
purchased diskettes as archival copies.
45. 594 F. Supp. at 622.
46. Id. at 622-623 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 623.
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sessed, and to pay to plaintiff sanctions in the amount of $8,179.84
(an amount representing Formula's profits on sales in violation of
the preliminary injunction).4" The parties eventually settled, stipu-
lating to the issuance of a permanent injunction.
Steven J. Johnson
48. Id.
